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Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism
Abstract
Terrorism is an extreme form of political violence, that is inherently abhorrent in nature.
Yet, it continues to attain enough support to continue and survive. The recent proliferation
of Islamic State and its ever increasing domestic and international civilian support base
urges immediate attention to this question. While most research holds that provision of
public goods by terrorist groups is the primary cause for high levels of civilian support, I
argue that, terrorist groups are more interested in resource extraction rather than
resource provision. Additionally, these studies pay scant attention to existing resource
structure, especially territorial and political control to explain terrorist-civilian interaction.
This paper emphasizes the bi-directional nature of this interaction – a. perception of
civilians by the terrorist group and b. terrorist group’s perception of the civilians. To
analyze levels of civilian support for terrorism, I compare fifteen terrorist groups using
qualitative comparative analysis and show how territory, political competition, ethnicity,
target selection and organizational structure combine to explain conditions that lead
terrorist groups to include or exclude civilian population for support. Based on the variance
in support networks of terrorist groups, counter-terrorism policies should also differ. High
civilian support indicates the need to use non-military methods to decrease the appeal of
terrorist groups. However, terrorist groups with more diffused and multiple support
structures need more collaborative and coercive measures to intercept all the possible links
to the main group.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss2/
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Introduction
When and how do terrorist groups attract high levels of civilian support?
When discussing support for terrorism, scholars have usually identified and
analyzed active support in the form of material and financial aid in the form
of the following sources–communities (population), states, diaspora, charities
and aid from non-governmental organizations; organized criminal groups,
and other insurgent and terrorist groups. Yet others have explored behavioral
and attitudinal support, which can be both active and passive, to assess rebel
group’s military success.1 Literature that specifically focus on understanding
certain aspects of civilian support for terrorism discuss levels of violence used
against civilian and availability of resources.2 Some others analyze the
relevance of religion and support for terrorism3. Yet others have studied
whether anti-Americanism is the major cause of popular support for
terrorism.4 Another set of scholarship analyzing the relationship between
Levitt, Matthew, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise,” Testimony
given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington,
D.C. 25 (2005); Brynjar, Lia, and Katja Skjølberg, “Why terrorism occurs: a survey of
theories and hypotheses on the causes of terrorism,” Oslo, FFI/RAPPORT2000/02769 (2000): 17; Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau,
and David Brannan. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corporation, 2001); Mascini, Peter, “Can the Violent Jihad Do Without
Sympathizers?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29:4 (2006): 343-357; Smith, Paul J.
“Climate change, weak states and the War on Terrorism in South and Southeast
Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic
Affairs 29:2 (2007): 264-285; Millen, Raymond A., and Steven Metz, Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in the 21st century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, (Diane
Publishing, 2004); Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?
Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka,” Terrorism and Political
Violence 21:2 (2009): 306-326.
2 Rebels might include a host of actors including terrorists, guerilla fighters, insurgents,
secessionists etc. Since their behavior towards generating fear using violence is common
and overlapping, I include an analysis of rebel-civilian interaction in general, to
understand terrorist behavior. Weinstein, Jeremy, Inside Rebellion (New York:
Cambridge University Press 2007). This study focuses on understanding rebel behavior.
Though his analysis does not particularly mention terrorists, the behavior as emulated by
the rebels in his study is applicable to various terrorist groups’ behavior, especially left
wing extremists. For this reason, I include his analysis on rebel behavior and resource
endowment in my discussion of terrorist-civilian interactions.
3 Fair, C. Christine, and Bryan Shepherd. “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from
Fourteen Muslim Countries,” Coastal Management 29:1 (2006): 51-74; De Mesquita,
Ethan Bueno, Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007).
4 Tessler, Mark, and Michael DH Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and
Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 51:2 (2007): 305-328. These authors investigate the anti-American sentiment
in the Arab world, particularly Algeria and Jordan to understand whether religion and
culture, or political and economic considerations are the determinants of support for
terrorism following this anti-Americanism.
1
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terrorist groups and civilian support have considered inter-group
competition, economic resource maximization, active and passive coercion,
and resource provision by the terrorist group.5 Bloom investigates why
Palestinian public opinion increasingly supported radical Islamist
organizations and their method of suicide bombings. One of the causes as
identified by Bloom is inter-group competition.6 Her argument closely follows
that of Kydd and Walter, who state that groups engaged in outbidding use
violence to convince the public that terrorists have greater resolve than the
other rivals do.7 The competition between Hamas and Fatah is a classic
example of this behavior.
Other studies investigating the link between civilian support and terrorism
point out that terrorist groups’ ability to provide public goods increase public
support for these groups.8 However, not all civilians receive equal incentives.
As Weinstein points out, some civilians get favorable treatment, but others do
not, mainly because of the existing resources.9 While these authors emphasize
the role of competition and resources to discuss rebel-civilian and terroristcivilian interactions, others show the importance of ideology and
organizational structure. These variables are no doubt important. However, a
crucial element that is missing is the discussion about support for terrorism
the relevance of territory. Territorial access by terrorist groups, in addition to
organizational strength, ideology, financial support, competition, or
partnership with other groups, is an important element in determining how
frequently terrorists interact with civilians. My key theoretical interest is in
the combined effect of terrorist group’s territorial control, ideology, ethnicity,
political competitiveness, and target selection on civilian support. While
previous studies have considered some of these categories, none has

Bloom, Mia, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and
Outbidding,” Political Science Quarterly 119:1 (2004): 61-88; Byman, Daniel,
“Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31:2 (2008): 165200; Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing
the Club Model,” Journal of Public Economics 92:10 (2008): 1942-1967; Lilja, Jannie,
“Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain
Constituent Support in Sri Lanka,” 306-326.
6 Bloom, Mia, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and
Outbidding,” 61-88.
7 Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist
Violence,” International Organization 56:2 (2002): 263-296.
8 Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin. “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the
Club Model,”1942-1956; Berman, Eli, Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An
Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias. No. w10004. National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2003; Simon, Steven, and Jeff Martini. “Terrorism: Denying al
Qaeda its Popular Support,” Washington Quarterly 28:1 (2004): 129-145.
9 Weinstein, J. M., Inside Rebellion (Boston, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
5
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emphasized the role of territory in determining levels of civilian support. This
article addresses this gap and builds on the existing scholarship of civilianterrorist interaction.
Territory can feature in two ways in terrorism–as a goal, and/or actual
control of territory. Kydd and Walter identify territorial change as one of the
important goals of terrorism.10 Territorial change means taking territory away
from the state with the purpose of establishing a new state. In Sri Lanka, the
Tamil Tigers fought mainly for separate Tamil territory. Another purpose of
taking territory away from the state can include joining another state. Lashkar
-e-Taiba is fighting for Kashmir region in India, to become a part of
Pakistan.11 Territorial control is not a straightforward concept, because
sometimes terrorist groups deliberately do not seize territory to maintain
their clandestine nature.12 These terrorist organizations with no territorial
control are classified as underground organizations.13 The Red Army Faction
in Germany was fully clandestine and operated in cities only. Merrari uses the
criterion of territorial control to distinguish between terrorism and guerilla
warfare.14 However, many groups use terrorism and guerilla warfare
interchangeably. These hybrid groups can and often does have access to
territory, and it is worth exploring how access to territory can determine the
levels of civilian support received by the terrorist group.15
Assessing levels of civilian support for terrorism is a timely and relevant topic.
This is a challenging but relevant topic because as conflict progresses over
time, people increasingly become dependent on rebels for their livelihoods,
physical security, and this leads to their further cooperation with the rebels.16
For example, territorial control gave LTTE new opportunities to extract

Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International
Security 31:1 (2006): 49-80.
11 Ibid.
12 De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels without a Territory An Analysis
of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56:4
(2012): 580-603.
13 Della Porta, Donatella, “Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations:
Italian left-wing terrorism,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 155-69.
14 Merari, Ariel, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political
Violence 5:4 (1993): 213-251.
15 Since terrorists and insurgents share some common elements like method of violence
used, motivation for using violence, this overlap is difficult to ignore. Most of the terrorist
groups borrow heavily from insurgent tactics and vice-versa. In this paper, this point is
taken into consideration to understand the terrorist group behavior.
16 Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-326.
10
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constituent support.17 The comparison of civilian support for terrorist groups
shows ‘how’ differently terrorist groups behave with the constituent
population that they seek to represent. For instance, the degree of public
support seems to have a strong influence on the strategic use of violence by
groups.18 A full understanding of terrorism needs to look beyond counting
incidents and consider its severity, differences in strategies, constraints, range
of actions, organizational dynamics, and relevance of host populace and
competition from other groups.19 Faria and Arce point out that strategic
analyses of terrorism are broadly divided into two types–one studies the
consequences of counter-terrorism policies, the other set of scholarship looks
at rationality of decisions made by individual terrorists. Faria and Arce
introduce the relevance of a third line of enquiry–recruitment of human
resources for terrorist activity.20 Comparing levels of civilian support can
show how people are directly and indirectly associated with terrorist groups.
Analysis of civilian support is also pertinent for counter-terrorism. Various
terrorist groups manipulate public opinion in many ways.21 Often the
terrorists use violence in such a way as to provoke counter-terrorism
responses that result in backlash against the government by constituent
population.22 Public support thus becomes an important element for
competing against the government. In Nepal, state responses to Maoist
conflict were so repressive that national and international audiences criticized
it. The Nepalese state violated human rights. This worked in favor of the
Maoist group who gained considerable popular support following this. It is
important for governments to assess the levels of support to plan specific
responses, often combining military and non-military methods.

Ibid. The author mentions about territorial entrapment to explain how rebels treat
civilian population over time. She explains that with acquisition of territory, LTTE
territorially entrapped people by restricting movement of people to leave these areas. The
LTTE did this to prevent information leaks and increase recruitment (p. 315)
18 Clauset, A., L. Heger, M. Young, and K. S. Gleditsch, “The Strategic Calculus of
Terrorism: Substitution and Competition in the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” Cooperation
and Conflict 45:1 (2010): 6-33.
19 Ibid.
20Faria, J. R. and D. G. Arce, “Terror Support and Recruitment,” Defence and Peace
Economics 16:4 (2005): 263-273; Pape, Robert A, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide
Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97:3 (2003): 343-361.
21 Bueno de Mesquita, E., “Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim
World,” United States Institute of Peace, Working Paper, No.1. (2007).
22 Bueno de Mesquita, E. and E. S. Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism,
Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science 51:2 (2007):
364-381, and De Figueiredo, R. and B. R. Weingast, “Vicious Cycles; Endogenous Political
Extremism and Political Violence,” Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper
2001-9 (2001), University of California, Berkeley.
17
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This article is organized as follows. In the first section, I discuss why terrorist
group’s access to territory along with other variables like terrorist group’s
political involvement, organizational strength, ties to other groups, target
selection, and ethnic composition of the area they operate from are important
for assessing levels of civilian support for terrorism. The second section
discusses the concepts, data, and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a
method and how this study used QCA. The third section analyzes the
empirical evidence and the concluding section mentions the key findings, the
relevance of the combined effects of territory, ideology, and organization in
determining the levels of civilian support and avenues for future research.

Terrorist-civilian Interaction: Determining levels of support for
terrorism
This article proceeds from the premise that both terrorists and civilians are
rational actors. However, rational behavior is usually influenced by sociopolitical and economic institutional arrangements underlying the societies
where violence is taking place.23 Therefore, it is important to analyze the
socio-political resource environment in which the terrorist groups operate to
learn how this environment can explain terrorist-civilian interaction and
varying levels of civilian support for terrorist groups.
In terrorist-civilian interaction there are two sets of rational action–one from
the point of view of the terrorist group and other from the point of view of
civilian population. From the terrorist group’s standpoint, the rational
decision to include or exclude civilian support is dependent on a set preexisting, dynamic and acquired conditions. Together, these conditions help
build a resource environment for the terrorist groups. These conditions
indirectly affect the civilian’s decision making as well. Based on their
perception of these conditions the civilians decide whether to support
terrorist groups. These conditions are therefore bi-directionally perceived by
a) directly by the terrorists and b) indirectly by the civilians. Since the
terrorist group is the main actor, the above-mentioned conditions are directly
relevant for their decision-making, and the civilians are secondary actors.24 In
this article, the focus is solely on terrorist-civilian interaction and deliberately
exclude the discussion on state actors in assessing civilian support, because
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Mogens K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen, “The political
economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism,” Public Choice 128:1-2
(2006): 289-315.
24 Terrorists are the main actors because they are initiators of violence and threats. In
many instances, if not all, terrorists act first, thereby beginning a chain of events.
23
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type of state and actions of the state (repressive, negligent, tolerant)
constitutes a different topic of discussion in relation to support for terrorism.
What is important is how civilians perceive terrorist group irrespective of the
role of the state, nature, and type of the state (democratic or authoritarian). In
addition, in some cases, states are involved in providing some support for
violence. By analyzing causal conditions like terrorist’s ideological motivation,
target selection, and political involvement, there is some indirect reference to
state function.
While it is not possible to include all the aspects of the pre-existing, dynamic
and acquired conditions that determine terrorist-civilian interaction, the
following are relevant - terrorist group’s ideological motivation; territorial
access; target selection; political involvement; sub-group affiliation and the
levels of ethnic fractionalization in the area of terrorist control. Scholars have
studied one or more of these to learn about how terrorist groups survive, how
lethal they are and their organizational strength However, they are treated as
individual categories and few studies have analyzed the combined effects of
two or more of these conditions to analyze levels of civilian support. This
article highlights how these categories create the pre-existing, dynamic, and
acquired conditions that. Figure 1 explains the relevance of these conditions.

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss2/2
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Figure 1. Resource environment of terrorist group - pre-existing,
dynamic and acquired conditions

Source: Based on the theoretical discussion above, the author created this
table.
Pre-existing conditions are those that are already present when the terrorist
group begins to function, for instance ethnic composition of the area
ideological motivation (this can be religious or nationalist ideology) and
targets (national or international government/civilians). Dynamic conditions
are those that change over time. These conditions can include terrorist
group’s political participation over the course of time; various terrorist groups
began to operate as political parties and vice versa. Motivation and target
selection can fall under this category if they change. Acquired conditions are
those that the terrorist group gradually comes into possession, as is the
number of affiliations the group has. While there can be overlap between the
dynamic and acquired conditions, one distinction is that acquired conditions
might not change over time. These three types of conditions build the
resource environment for the terrorist group.

7
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Territorial control, for instance, provides the terrorist groups with safe-haven
or sanctuary where they can hide their weapons, train without being caught
and maintain communications with local civilians to gain relevant
information. Furthermore, this territorial control provides the terrorist group
with power to exercise coercion with local population.25 This location can be
strategically used to maintain ties with other affiliate organizations.
Sanctuaries are spaces safe from harassment and surveillance and it fosters
oppositional culture and group solidarity.26 It can work as spatial ‘preserves’
not necessarily in the geographical sense but as ‘free’ social spaces, where
members of subordinate groups discover their common problems and discuss
ways to overcome these. These spaces can be located within clubs,
associations, even within families of nationalist militants.27 To create these
social spaces, the terrorist groups have access to certain locations, which later
constitute part of the territorial control. These can be created nationally and
internationally. My focus is on national or domestic territorial control and
once territory is acquired formally or informally, it affects the functioning of
the group and it will always vie for territorial control, thereby making it more
of an acquired condition than dynamic.
Holding territory implies some measure of power and control over local
residents.28 To maintain this territory, the groups need social, political, and
economic resources. Therefore, terrorist group’s domestic territorial control
(national sanctuary) is a key determinant of the levels of civilian support that
the group receives. ‘Where’ and ‘how’ terrorist groups operate has direct
implication on how these groups are perceived by civilians. Territorial control
gains further relevance when certain conditions are present or absent. It is
important to discuss how it is associated with other preexisting, dynamic, and
acquired conditions like ideological motivation, target selection, political
Coercion is often a preferred tactic used by terrorists to gain information and some
level of support. While it is an important element, it is not the only method used. In this
paper, the theoretical focus is why we see civilian support for terrorist groups, and not
how they are forced to support terrorism. It is one way of understanding support. By
expanding the analysis of civilian support, this paper shows when there is support even in
the absence of coercion.
26 Fantasia, Rick, and Eric L. Hirsch, “Culture in rebellion: The appropriation and
transformation of the veil in the Algerian revolution,” in eds. H. Johnston and B.
Klandermans, Social Movements and Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press 1995): 144-59; Haussler, Nicholas., I., J. Russel, and A. M. Baylouny, Third
Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency (Monterey, California: Naval
Postgraduate School, Thesis 2005).
27 Johnston, Hank, Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, 1939-1979 (NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1991).
28 De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels Without a Territory: An
Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” 580-603.
25
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involvement, sub-group affiliation, and levels of ethnic fractionalization in the
area of control, in determining levels of civilian support for terrorism.

Concepts, Data and Method
In this article, a terrorist group is defined as:
A group of non-state actors (sub-national/clandestine) having
national and/or transnational territorial base, but is not
formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of
violence or threat of violence that they use strategically with a
political purpose, directed against representatives of a formally
recognized state actor in the international system (domestic or
transnational) and/or civilians with the aim of influencing
several audiences.29
This definition of a terrorist group, offers both general and contextual
understanding of the term. To do this, Gerring’s method is used. The method
has three components––the term, the phenomena to be defined and the
properties or attributes that define it.30 To define the term contextually, the
attributes of terrorist group (following its definition) are included and the
function of these attributes is further elaborated to determine how some of

Definition of terrorism is drawn from existing scholarship, particularly, “Politically
motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of
publicity plays a significant role,” in Weinberg, L., A. Pedahzur, and S. Hirsch-Hoefler,
“The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16:4
(2004): 777-794.
“Modern terrorism refers to a type of violent interaction initiated by a non-state actor
which is not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence or a
valid initiation of violent interactions directed against representatives (human, material
or symbolic) of a formally recognized state actor in the international system which does
not follow the institutionalized rules and convention of military engagement,” see
Lizardo, O, “Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centered
Approach,” Journal of World-Systems Research 14 (2008): 91-118.
Another much used definition of terrorism put forth by American Law (Title 22 of the US
Code, Section 265 f(d)) defines it as: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience…” And Goodwin (2006) defines it as “The
strategic use of violence and threats of violence usually intended to influence several
audiences by oppositional political groups against civilians or non-combatants who
belong to specific ethnicity, religion or national group, social class or some other
collectivity without regard to their individual identities or role.” See Goodwin, J., “A
Theory of Categorical Terrorism,” Social Forces 84:4 (2006): 2027-2046.
30 Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 39.
29
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these are linked with civilian support31. Table 1 presents the general and
specific attributes and the functions of these attributes. In particular, focus on
the techniques, targets, actors, and goals to conceptualize the terrorist group.
Table 1. Attributes of a Terrorist Group and Functions of these
Attributes
Concept

Attributes

Functions of
the attributes
Interaction
between groups
of people defined
by violence and
fear

How functions are
related
The functions define
how the terrorist group
interacts with their
audiences, especially
civilians

Territorial or
transnational
base

Control over
territory and
sections of
population

This interaction is
governed by fear,
punishment, common
grievances, control and
coercion

Targets civilians
and
governments

Motives, goals
and action

Collective of
people using
violence (nonstate actors)
Terrorist
Group

Not formally
Justification for
recognized as a
the use of
legitimate
violence is absent
wielder of the
means of
violence or
threat of
violence
Source: Table created by author.
This study analyzes fifteen terrorist groups in this study. The selected cases
illustrate the outcome of interest positively, meaning that for these positive
cases the outcome of interest (high civilian support) is occurring. For
example, some of the cases (terrorist groups) show high levels of civilian
support (outcome of interest), while other cases do not necessarily show the
Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology, 70. At the general level, as suggested by
Gerring a definition is not concerned with empirical matters but rather looks at ‘formal’
criteria of the term. To determine the ‘formal’ criteria, I use three steps–sampling usages
(existing definitions), typologizing attributes and construction of minimal and ideal
typical definition. For details about definitions please see Weinberg et al (2004); Lizardo
(2008); American Law (Title 22 of the US Code, Section 265 f(d)); Goodwin (2006).
31
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occurrence of the outcome (i.e. they do not have high levels of civilian support
and in this sense, they are negative cases). Together the set of positive and
negative cases constitute the relevant set of cases for the analysis.
Furthermore, the fifteen groups included here are some of the most important
terrorist groups because of their prolonged survival. In existing terrorism
literature, there is an over emphasis on studying Islamic fundamentalist
organizations. Therefore, in addition to Islamic fundamentalist organizations,
I include left extremist groups, with a focus on Maoist groups, active in South
Asia. Highlighting both right and left extremist groups provides detailed
insights about how differences in ideological motivation affect civilian
support for terrorist groups. Cases are selected from both developing and
developed regions and different political regimes to include regional diversity.
The outcome variable is civilian support. This constitutes an important aspect
of strategic communication and can function at two levels––ideological or
attitudinal (passive) and/or behavioral (direct or active). The focus here is on
ideological support. Behavioral and attitudinal support is difficult to
demarcate. Lilja points out that both attitudinal and behavioral support are
necessary for the rebel groups to succeed militarily.32 Lilja uses the term
behavioral support as an ‘act’ of providing support.33 This can range from
passive to neutral co-operation or silence, offering food. Shelter, finances, and
information to active provision of armed and non-armed services. In existing
terrorism literature, there is no concrete definition of civilian support. Khalil,
Paul, and Lilja distinguish between attitudinal and behavioral support to
identify the function of support.34 Table 2 elaborates this distinction.

Lilja, Jannie. “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-328.
Ibid.
34 Khalil, James. “Insurgent–Populace Relations in Nepal: An Analysis of Attitudinal and
Behavioural Support,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23:2 (2012): 221-244; Paul,
Christopher, “How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain Support?” Social Science for
Counterterrorism 74:6-C (2009): 113; see also: Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or
Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-328.
32
33
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Table 2. Common Elements in Conceptualizing Support for
Terrorism
Paul 2009, Lilja 2009 and
Khalil (2012)conceptualizing support for
terrorism and armed
groups
1. Finances

Related actions

‘act’ of supporting
2. Shelter, information/ safe
house, armed forces
3. Passive consent, not
Expressed support,
reporting events, passive
sympathizing for the cause, not
neutral co-operation, nonprotesting or preventing it.
armed services
Source: Paul (2009), Lilja (2009), and Khalil (2012).
Passive consent is often a precursor to active support later. Active support for
terrorism is often difficult to measure accurately. Although passive consent is
also a challenging concept, public opinion surveys have tried to capture the
attitudinal support for terrorism making it possible to measure, in some way,
the levels, and causes of this type of support. Following the discussion on
attitudinal and behavioral support, this article identifies common elements of
conceptualizing civilian support as:
Attitudinal and co-operative support by a section of the
constituent population that is represented by the terrorist
group, located in the terrorist group’s home country, where the
terrorist group has some territorial control or base.
Collating civilian support data for terrorism is challenging because few
surveys are done to measure attitudinal support and it is difficult to
conduct these surveys because of accessibility of data due to sensitivity
of the topic. For this article, macro-level data, collected from existing
public opinion surveys is combined with micro-level data collected
through field research and archival document analysis.35 Appendix i.
The author used the following public opinion surveys–World Public Opinion Poll
(2006), Times of India Poll (2010), Himal Media Public Opinion Poll (2003),
Euskobarometer–Universidad del Pais Vaseo (2009), Gallup Poll (1998-2001),
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research–Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No.
35
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lists the data sources and levels of civilian support for the fifteen
terrorist groups under study here.
The data indicates that civilian support for the fifteen groups ranges
from 2 percent to 60 percent. What is challenging about measuring
ideological support for terrorist groups is determining the correct
quantitative value to estimate high or low levels. Even if a group has 5
percent, popular support it is substantial for terrorist groups. What
might represent a lower value, for instance 15 percent can actually be a
high level of support for terrorist groups. For estimating low levels of
civilian support, a low percentage level––2 percent to 15 percent is
assigned to determine groups having low levels of civilian support.
Groups that have 60 percent to 15 percent civilian support are
considered as having high levels of civilian support.
There are six causal conditions under study.36 The focus is to understand
combination of conditions, thereby highlighting causal complexity. Territorial
control depicts the regional area controlled by terrorist groups in their home
country where they have active base (country of origin and where they
conduct operation).37 The second causal condition is target selection, which is
classified into four categories––a) purely national, b) mostly national with
limited international targets, c) mostly international with limited national
target and d) purely international. The third causal condition is ideological
motivation. Based on data from Global Terrorism Database (GTD), groups are
classified based on a) having purely religious motivation, b) predominantly
religious in conjunction with nationalist separatist motivation, c)
predominantly nationalist/separatist with low religious motivation and d)
purely nationalist/separatist motivation or purely non-religious motivation.
The fourth causal condition is ethnic fractionalization. To analyze this
condition, Fearon’s data is used to measure the level of ethnic composition in
46 (2012), Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2009-2010, 2012, SETA and Pollmark (2009),
Public Opinion Poll, Lima 1991, and Harmon 1992. From each of the public opinion
surveys, the author identified key questions that directly focus on measuring support for
the respective terrorist group. Since the research relied on multiple data sources, the
author identified common key questions in these surveys (mentioned in Appendix ii.).
These questions contain direct and indirect inquiries about the particular group and/or
its main leader, and the methods used by these groups. Several of these questions look at
measuring public attitudes about the violence used by particular organizations.
36 In qualitative comparative analysis, the independent variable is known as a causal
condition. The dependent variable is known as an outcome variable.
37 Territorial control does not always mean creating autonomous zones. It can be areas
regularly frequented by terrorist groups, where they have informal bases with training
camps. Within a particular region, there can be multiple locations of this sort.
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the terrorist home country from where they gain civilian support.38 The
number of sub-groups related to the terrorist groups measures the fifth causal
condition, sub-group affiliation. To determine the number of allies, the GTD
database is used. The sixth and final causal condition is political involvement.
By this, I mean levels of active engagement by terrorist groups in electoral
politics and/or levels of affiliation with political parties that contest for
elections. To measure this, I rely on existing empirical studies on terrorist
group profiles by Weinberg et al.39 Following this data, groups are classified
as a) actively participates in electoral politics, b) not active in electoral politics
but has support from other political party c) not active in electoral politics but
has marginal support from other political party, and d) not active in electoral
politics and no support from political parties. Appendices ii and iii, present
the causal conditions is details.
Fuzzy set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) is suitable for this
analysis because it is relevant to assess the complex and conjectural
(conditions are sufficient in combination) nature of the study. Furthermore,
due to this connection between causality and complexity, QCA is naturally
suited for cross-case diversity meaning that cases with similar levels of
civilian support might not have the same causal mechanisms that generate it.
Each causal path, no matter how many cases this path represents is relevant
and potentially meaningful.40 What is most interesting about QCA is that it
allows the researcher to have high level of familiarity with the data. QCA is an
interactive and creative process.41 It allows for combining qualitative and
quantitative data. The method of fs/QCA has several stages and is indeed
labor intensive. However, it describes and analyzes data in a systematic
format. At the same time, it does allow the researcher intuitive freedom to
construct knowledge about each case. Additionally, it offers the researcher an
ability to work with relatively smaller number of cases in comparison to
purely large-N studies where number of cases must meet a minimum

Fearon, James D. “Ethnic and cultural diversity by country,” Journal of Economic
Growth 8:2 (2003): 195-222.
39 Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist
Groups, Vol. 10. (New York, Routledge, 2008).
40 Rihoux, Benoît, and Bojana Lobe, “The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA):
Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison,” The Sage handbook of case-based
methods (2009): 222-242.
41 Rihoux, Benoît, “Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related systematic
comparative methods recent advances and remaining challenges for social science
research,” International Sociology 21:5 (2006): 679-706.
38
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threshold. QCA can be applied to research designs involving small and
intermediate size Ns (5-50).42

Measuring Causal conditions: Fuzzy Membership Values
To analyze the data using fs/QCA the next step is to calibrate the fuzzy
membership scores of the six causal conditions. Based on the data as
presented in the appendices, both direct and indirect method of calibration is
used to assign fuzzy membership scores of these causal conditions for each
case. A range of data (both qualitative and quantitative measures) is included.
The calibration of the data was done using the fs/QCA software, using the
command ‘compute’, followed by the function calibrate and identifying the
variable and the three anchor points for each variable (outcome variable and
causal conditions). Table 3 and 4 shows the process by which the initial
values are determined.
Table 3. Assigning Fuzzy Membership Scores to the Outcome Variable:
Civilian Support
Outcome
variable
Civilian support

Percentage

Membership

Anchor points

0%
15%

Fully out
Threshold of
inclusion/exclusion
Fully in

0
0.5

60%

Table 4. Causal Conditions and Fuzzy Membership Scores
Causal
Indicators
Conditions
(VARIABLE
NAME)
Target selection
(NATIONALTAR)

90 percent events in home country
45 percent events in home country
20 percent events in home country

Ethnic
fractionalization
(ETHFRAC)

Ethnic fractionalization score 0.811
Ethnic fractionalization score 0.300
Ethnic fractionalization score 0.161

1

membership

Fully in
Threshold of
exclusion
Fully out
Fully in
Threshold of
exclusion
Fully out

Recent research shows that QCA is increasingly being used to study 100-1000 cases.
The method can be applied to a vast range of cases. Fiss, Peer C., “Case studies and the
configurational analysis of organizational phenomena,” Handbook of case study
methods (2009): 424-440.
42
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Causal
Conditions
(VARIABLE
NAME)

Indicators

membership

Organizational
Affiliates
(AFFILIATES)

Link with 36 groups
Link with 5 groups

Fully in
Threshold of
exclusion
Fully out

Link with 0 groups
Ideology
(RELIDEOLOGY)

Territorial
control
(TERCONTROL)

Political
involvement
(POLINVOLVE)

Purely religious
Mostly religious with nationalist/separatist
Less religious and mostly
nationalist/separatist
Purely non-religious
Based only in home country
Mostly based in home country, limited
presence outside
Loosely based in home country,
considerable presence abroad
No presence in home country, only located
abroad
Actively participates in electoral politics
Not active in electoral politics but has
support from other political party
Not active in electoral but has marginal
support from other political party
Not active in electoral politics and no
support from party

4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1

4
3
2

4=fully in
2.5=
threshold
1=fully out
4=fully in
2.5=
threshold
1=fully out

4=fully in
2.5=
threshold
1=fully out

1

Source: Created by author
It further mentions the variable names for the six causal conditions. The
values for these corresponding anchor points are mentioned in Table 5. The
numerical values linked to three qualitative anchor points represent the
criteria for inclusion or exclusion in a set (fully in, threshold of
exclusion/inclusion, fully out). Following this, it generates a membership
value based on a continuous scale ranging from 0.95 to 0.05.

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss2/2
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Table 5. Fuzzy Membership Scores for the Outcome Variable and Causal
Conditions
GROUPNAM
CIV_
AFFI
ETH
NAT_TA
REL_IDE TER_CO
E
SUPP LIAT
FRAC
R
OLOGY
N
ES
GET
TROL
ABUSAYAAF
ALQAEDA
CPIMAO
CPNMAO
ETA
FARC
GIA
HAMAS
HEZBOL
IRA
LTTE
LASHKART
PKK
SHNPATH
TALIBAN

0.12
0.14
0.95
0.60
0.40
0.07
0.12
0.95
0.92
0.83
0.68
0.61
0.55
0.31
0.20

0.50
0.95
0.62
0.52
0.35
0.52
0.50
0.62
0.57
0.52
0.23
0.60
0.66
0.14
0.35

0.05
0.93
0.95
0.90
0.77
0.89
0.53
0.79
0.94
0.06
0.68
0.80
0.49
0.88
0.93

0.95
0.19
0.95
0.95
0.94
0.95
0.94
0.55
0.81
0.90
0.95
0.05
0.89
0.95
0.84

0.27
0.95
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.95
0.27
0.73
0.05
0.05
0.73
0.05
0.05
0.95

0.95
0.27
0.95
0.95
0.73
0.95
0.73
0.95
0.73
0.73
0.95
0.73
0.73
0.95
0.73

0.05
0.05
0.27
0.95
0.73
0.73
0.05
0.95
0.95
0.73
0.27
0.05
0.27
0.05
0.73

Source: Created by author

Empirical Results: Analysis of the Sufficient Conditions
To determine the sufficient conditions for high civilian support for terrorist
groups, truth-table algorithm is used. This truth table lists all possible
combinations and each configuration’s empirical outcome.43 The algorithm
reveals combinations of causal conditions that are sufficient to explain the
outcome. The meaningful patterns of necessity and sufficiency as generated
by fs/QCA are based on the idea of subset relations between the combination
of causal conditions and the outcome.44 The assessment of sufficient
conditions involves examining the membership of all the terrorist groups in
the set of those who have high levels of civilian support, with their
membership in the sets of causal conditions, and this membership in the
condition is greater than or equal to membership in the set of high civilian
support. The proportion of cases for which this relationship holds true is
known as ‘consistency’ and the ‘coverage’ score shows how many instances
show this relationship.
This analysis uses the complex solution to locate these combinations. In settheoretical logic, logical AND (*) refers to the intersection of sets and logical
Ragin, Charles C. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond, Vol. 240.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
44 Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann, “Standards of good practice in
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets,” Comparative Sociology 9:3
(2010): 397-418.
43
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OR (+) to the union of sets. In addition, the symbol ~, indicates the absence of
a condition or NOT. The strongest membership of each case in any
combination with a value of 1.00 is considered an ‘ideal’ case followed by
consistency of 0.9 and 0.8. For my analysis, I look at cases that are marked by
a consistency score of .85 and higher. Table 5 shows the consistency and
coverage scores of the configurations.
The first set of conditions in Table 6 shows that when a group has high
number of affiliates or connections with other similar organizations in
conjunction with territorial control and high levels of ethnic fragmentation,
but not active political participation and international target (not national
target), then it is sufficient for high levels of civilian support. The consistency
for this combination is 0.92 but the coverage is low 0.20. The group that
represents this combination is Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). However, what is
important here is the fact that the number of affiliates in addition to ethnic
fragmentation and territorial control matters when the group’s ideology is
more religious and partially leans towards nationalist/separatist. In addition,
it matters when the group is not actively involved in local politics, and when
the target is international. The predominant motive for LeT is securing
Kashmir (now Indian Territory) to make it be part of Pakistan. The
underlying motive is religious but their demand is territorial. Predominantly,
the group wants to liberate the Islamic population residing in the Indian
territory of Kashmir.
Table 6. Sufficient Conditions for High Civilian Support for
Terrorist Groups
Analysis of sufficient conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups
High civilian support
for terrorist groups

Affiliates AND Ethnic fragmentation
AND
~National target AND
~Political involvement AND
Religious ideology AND Territorial
control
Affiliates AND Ethnic fragmentation
AND
National target AND Territorial
control AND

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss2/2
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.2.1562

Consistency Coverage
0.92x
0.20

0.84y

0.44

Example groups

Lashkar –e -Toiba
(LeT)

CPN(M),
Hezbollah, Hamas
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Political involvement
Affiliates AND National Target AND
~ Religious ideology AND
Territorial control AND Political
involvement

0.88x

0.44

CPI(Maoist), IRA
and Hamas

Ethnic fragmentation AND
National target AND
~ Religious ideology AND
Territorial control AND Affiliates

0.88x

0.47

CPI(M), Hamas and
CPN(M)

Total solution

0.87

0.68

Notes:
~ indicates the inverse of a condition (1 -membership score).
Meets 0.70 consistency benchmark for usually sufficient combination. Meets .85
consistency benchmark for almost always sufficient condition.

Source: Created by author.
The second set of conditions show that when the number of affiliates, ethnic
fragmentation, territorial control, and national target selection along with
active political participation combine then it is sufficient for high levels of
civilian support. The consistency for this set is 0.84 and the coverage is 0.44.
A consistency score of more than .70 is usually sufficient. This combination
also reveals that ideology is not important when these conditions are present.
The group’s ideology can be purely religious, purely nationalist, or purely
political. What matters instead is the group’s active participation in local
politics or active support from political groups. This element combines with
the other factors to determine high levels of civilian support.
The third set indicates a combination of the following causal conditions––
number of affiliates, national target, territorial control and political
competition and not purely religious ideology. However, this set is like the
previous set of conditions there are some important differences. Here,
ideology matters when it is predominantly nationalist/separatist rather than
only religious. In addition, ethnic fragmentation is absent from this set. This
shift is due mainly to the fact that the group’s ideology is more nationalist or
political. This is important in assessing group relation to ethnic composition
of the region that they are representing. The consistency for this set is 0.88
and the coverage is 0.44. The cases that fall under this set are CPN(M), IRA,
and Hamas. Political participation and territorial control in addition to group
affiliations remains a strong indicator in this set.
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The fourth set of conditions show that ethnic fragmentation and national
target selection, in addition to territorial control, political competition, and
nationalist/separatist ideology can lead to higher levels of civilian support for
terrorist groups. It is important to note that nationalistic goals are more
relevant along with the other factors to determine whether a group will have
high levels of civilian support. In this set, the number of affiliates does not
matter. The consistency score for this set in 0.88 and the coverage is .47. The
groups that fall under this set are CPI(M), Hamas, and CPN(M).
The four sets of combination of causal conditions consistently show that
territorial control and number of affiliates is usually sufficient conditions that
may lead to high civilian support. What stands out, however, is the fact the
certain conditions matter only in the presence or absence of other
condition/s. Political involvement matters only when ideological motivation is
nationalist and or political. ETA in the Basque region can fall under this
category. Furthermore, this finding can be applied to analyze left extremist
terrorist organizations, some of which later transforms into legitimate
political parties; CPN(M) in Nepal is an example. Religious ideology matters
most in determining higher levels of civilian support when ethnic polarization
is high. This can be applied to analyze the Islamic State (IS) since they operate
in areas where the polarization between Shia and Sunni is high. Nationalist
ideology matters more when the group is vying for political involvement.
Additionally, political competition and national target selection in
combination with other factors plays an important role in determining the
levels of civilian support for particular terrorist groups.
The role of territorial control is significant. It indicates that terrorist groups
are keen to control significant geographical areas to construct a secure base.
Once they do have a base, they begin to interact with civilian population
frequently. To maintain the base, the groups also need civilian support. This
becomes further relevant when the groups are active in local or national
politics, or have active support from political groups. The case of the Maoist
group in Nepal is an appropriate example. The Communist Party of Nepal,
CPN(M) actively participated in the electoral politics. Immediately after the
abolishment of monarchy and the ceasefire in 2006, the CPN(M) won the
elections. This shows that they had active attitudinal support from the
population. Moreover, this group had and still has significant territorial
control and a clear aim of targeting the domestic government. The assessment
of necessary conditions further emphasizes which conditions explain the
occurrence of high civilian support.

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss2/2
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Empirical Results: Analysis of the Necessary Conditions
Table 7 presents the analysis of the necessary conditions for high levels of
civilian support for terrorist groups. This analysis reveals four usually
necessary conditions that can lead to high levels of civilian support for
particular terrorist groups. Three of these conditions––high ethnic
fragmentation, nationalist/separatist ideology and national target selection
are a priori conditions. The causal condition, territorial control is an acquired
condition. These conditions exceed the .85 benchmark for usually necessary
condition. The analysis of necessary conditions reveals that the following
conditions––territorial control, national target, not (~) religious ideology and
ethnic fragmentation are both necessary and sufficient conditions for
determining high levels of civilian support.
Table 7. Necessary Conditions for Civilian Support for Terrorist
Groups
Analysis of necessary conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups
High civilian support

~ High civilian support

Consistency

Coverage

Consistency

Territorial control
~Territorial control

0.96x
0.28

0.59
0.72

0.89x
0.35

0.56
0.90

Political involvement
~Political involvement

0.66
0.56

0.72
0.51

0.47
0.74y

0.52
0.69

Affiliates
~Affiliates

0.72y
0.64

0.70
0.65

0.66
0.69

0.65
0.71

Ethnic fragmentation
~Ethnic fragmentation

0.85x
0.35

0.60
0.69

0.82y
0.44

0.58
0.75

Religious ideology
~Religious ideology

0.34
0.79y

0.49
0.60

0.49
0.64

0.71
0.50

National target
~National target

0.85x
0.29

0.54
0.68

0.86x
0.28

0.55
0.66

Coverage

Notes:
~ indicates the inverse of a condition (1-membership score)
x Meets 0.70 consistency benchmark for usually necessary condition
y Meets .85 consistency benchmark for almost always necessary condition

Source: Created by author.
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However, as presented in the right-hand column, two of these conditions–
territorial control and national target are also related to the absence of civilian
support. Although this is paradoxical, this is largely due to the coding
technique used here. These causal conditions do not have a value of zero and
it is difficult to mark the presence or absence of these conditions by the score
of zero. All the cases have some levels of territorial control and the number of
events that occur nationally. Alternatively, the particularly interesting
evidence that is emphasized here is that these conditions by themselves or
singularly cannot explain the presence of high levels of civilian support. The
conditions must combine in order to create the recipe for high levels of
civilian support for particular terrorist organizations. As shown in the
analysis of sufficient conditions, the most outstanding feature of the
combinations is the presence of high territorial control in home country along
with other conditions, particularly important being political competition and
nationalist/separatist ideology.
The two other causal conditions that are related to low civilian support are no
political competition and when the groups have less number of affiliates or
none at all. When terrorist groups are not active in electoral politics and are
not part of any political organization, the likelihood of receiving popular
support decreases. Part of this explanation is related to the fact that without
political support, terrorist groups lose much of their constructed legitimacy.
This directly influences people’s perception of these groups. Again, these
groups for propagation as well as communication with civilians often use a
political platform. The second factor is absence of affiliates. The conclusion
that follows automatically from this is that the more affiliates that a terrorist
group has, the more likely it is that these groups are communicating with
more people. The possibility of reaching out to more people increases. All
these findings are relevant for counterterrorism.
The finding about political competition is highly relevant in analyzing the
present transformation of FARC in Colombia. This left extremist group is
undergoing a major shift in organizational structure, at present. FARC has a
long history with phases where they operated as purely terrorist organization,
narco-terrorist organization, and now, vying for legitimate political actor.
This changing nature of operation influenced the levels of civilian support,
which was high initially, but was low when narco-terrorism was their
preferred mode of operation. In 2016, civilian support has changed yet again.
In a recent referendum regarding the Colombian Peace deal between the
government and the FARC, Colombians did reject the peace deal. However,
the margin was narrow. Forty-nine point eight percent of the voters were in
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favor of the peace deal, indirectly implying that they support FARC in their
quest for legitimate political power. This is a significant change in levels of
civilian support considering that it was low during ARC’s narco-terrorism
phase. Political involvement, in this case, matters in determining levels of
civilian support for organizations like FARC.

Conclusion
The analysis in this article reveals key necessary and sufficient conditions that
combine to explain why and how some terrorist groups have high civilian
support while others do not. A variety of socio-political and geographical
conditions combines to explain the context in which terrorist groups gain
popular support. That some terrorist groups can gain high levels civilian
support certain conditions combine is important for several reasons. First, it
shows how terrorist groups despite their frequent use of violence, continue to
proliferate and survive. Second, it shows key patterns of terrorist-civilian
interactions. If terrorist organizations with a strong commitment to
nationalist or political agenda hold territory and are well networked, the
groups are more probable to attract civilian support. Civilians regularly assess
the terrorist group’s commitment to the cause. Whether they ideologically
support the group or not depends on this perception. Third, the findings
indicate that contrary to popular belief that most people despise terrorism,
there is considerable civilian support for it. This article looks at passive
ideological support, which is often a precursor to active support. Fourth, it
emphasizes the complexity of terrorism. Most studies analyze specific
terrorist groups, types, and organizational mechanism or include event
analysis. This study analyzes a different layer of indirect engagement, thereby
urging counter-terrorism to look beyond military response. Fifth, it opens
avenues for future research on the topic of support for terrorism.
Possible areas of study include–analysis of levels of support for left extremist
groups versus right extremist groups; distinction between rural and urban
support base for terrorism and detailed analysis of types of violence used by
terrorist organization and how it affects the levels of popular support. This
study highlights six causal conditions. However, this list is not exclusive.
Other possible conditions that can be relevant are state repression and types
of violence used by terrorist groups. Furthermore, this analysis does not
address the question of temporal variation in determining civilian support.
For many terrorist groups, civilian support changes over time. While at the
inception, a terrorist group can begin with high or low civilian support; this
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can gradually change due to various factors. This might be another avenue of
future research.
The combination of conditions further reveal that those terrorist groups
having active links with local/national politics with substantial control over
territory will have different interactions with civilians than those that have
territorial control but no active role in local politics. Along with this condition
the demography of terrorist home country, particularly ethnic composition
combine to explain that ethnic homogeneity does not always lead to higher
levels of civilian support. The other key conditions are choice of target and
events. If the enemy is usually, the national government with substantial
events happening in home country then the other conditions like political
competition, territory, and mainly nationalist/separatist ideology becomes
highly relevant to explain the levels of civilian support. Another significant
factor that is further revealed by the analysis is that nationalist/separatist
ideology and not purely religious ideology is tied to higher civilian support.
These findings have direct consequences for counter-terrorism.
The existing public opinion surveys imply that only some of the major
terrorist groups and their home countries have been included in these
surveys. However, what is needed is a more comprehensive approach to locate
and measure popular support for terrorist groups. This in itself should be part
of the counter terrorism process. As the passive support from civilians in the
terrorist home country is directly linked to the group’s survival and regular
resource extraction, it is important to analyze how and in what capacity the
civilians can be deterred from supporting these groups. If the terrorist groups
relate the support to systematic punishment or provision of incentives then
information should be culled from the people with specific details about the
methods used by the terrorist groups. Often there is high public grievance
against the state and existing government policies. In these cases, the national
government must understand which areas of socio-economic and political
development needs attention. These governments should also work
extensively to decrease the lure of terrorist groups. The process of gauging
civilian’s perception of terrorist group is the necessary first step in assessing
the popularity of the group. This can be followed by elaborate programs to
intercept the groups or their affiliates. Present counter terrorism policies
include extensive military methods to repress terrorist groups. However, in
areas where terrorists are in regular contact with the civilians, non-military
methods should be introduced to make the appeal for terrorism less
attractive. The first step of this non-military method should include an
assessment of public attitudes towards the terrorist group.
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Counter-terrorism policies are often designed based on the assumption that
all terrorist groups operate using the same strategies. Comparing civilian
support for terrorist groups reveals that terrorist-civilian interactions vary.
This finding is especially relevant for counter-terrorism. Anti-terrorist
policies are usually equated with deterrence. Governments all over the world
have used strict anti-terrorism laws, repressive military measures, curtailing
political, and human rights. These sorts of responses have largely ignored
other possibilities, especially non-military methods to curb terrorism. For
terrorist groups with high civilian support, non-military methods are
essential. Using non-military methods will have a two-fold benefit. First,
civilians will refrain from immediately criticizing government response. It
might strategically help the government to reach out to the population.
Second, it will end the cycle of violence by introducing peaceful ways of
resolving conflict.
High civilian support means that terrorist groups are deeply entrenched in
the society. Additionally, my findings show that these groups have territorial
control in the home country, are often active in electoral politics, are
motivated by nationalist/separatist ideology, and usually have several
affiliates. Since these groups are intrinsically linked with the socio-political
scene, some non-military methods are possible options. These methods can
be applied at two levels–one designed for civilians and the other for the
terrorist groups. High civilian support for particular terrorist groups
challenges the conventional military response to terrorism. The complex
interactions between terrorist and civilians require programs that undermine
the effectiveness or attractiveness of the terrorist groups. For example, to
undermine the Red Brigades, a vigorous public education program in concert
with an effective amnesty program (the pentiti program) was crucial in
reducing public support for the Red Brigades.45 Atran suggests another line of
defense that suggests appealing to Muslim communities to stop supporting
religious schools and charities that fund terrorist networks.46 Frey and
Luechinger suggest that positive incentives to abstain from violence are
constructive and a way that introduces non-violent alternative to address
terrorist’s political agendas. These authors further suggest increasing incomes

Post, J. M., “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho‐ cultural Foundations of
Contemporary Terrorism,” Political Psychology 26:4 (2005): 615-636.
46 Atran, S., “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 27:3 (2004): 6590. The education program framed the terrorists as murderers rather than cultural
heroes. The terrorists were also seen as damaging the economy and hurting the entire
society.
45
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in peaceful occupations.47 Furthermore, since terrorist groups with territorial
control have considerable access to constituent population, programs should
be implemented to deprive terrorist outfits of territory that they use as safe
havens.
Methodologically, this analysis emphasizes the significance of the interactions
between pre-existing/a priori conditions and acquired conditions, which
constitutes the environment where the terrorist groups originate and
continue their activities. Subsequently these interactions are responsible for
high civilian support for these groups. In contrast to existing studies on
terrorism and popular support that mentions the importance of resource
provision, this study indicates another component, that is, resource extraction
in the form of ideological support from the constituency. This reiterates the
fact that terrorist groups are not altruistic but predatory in nature. In fact,
resource prevision can be a necessary precondition for future resource
extraction. The pre-existing and acquired conditions of the terrorist groups
create a resource environment. The groups carefully assess this environment
to include or exclude civilian support. When terrorist groups have clear aim of
controlling territory it automatically leads them to interact with civilians. As
this study shows, territorial control by terrorist groups in addition to their
motives, targets, political aims, and networks with other organizations affects
the levels of civilian support received by them. Therefore, it is important to
delve deeper into the territorial bases of terrorism to see how ordinary
civilians are impacted. My findings ultimately address the complicated issues
present when intervening in communities where active terrorist groups are
interacting regularly with civilian population.

Frey, B. S., and S. Luechinger, “Three Strategies to Deal with Terrorism,” Economic
Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy 27:2 (2008): 107-114.
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Appendix i. Public Opinion Surveys for Terrorist Groups: Recording
Popular Support for Terrorist Groups
Groups

Source

Al Qa’eda

World Public
Opinion Poll 2006
(Sample:2,089
Afghan Adults
Lexis Nexis

Abu
Sayaaf
Group
(ASG)
CPI(M)

CPN(M)

Times of India Poll
2010
(521 Adults in
central India)
Himal Media Public
Opinion Poll 2003
(1,667 respondents)

ETA

Euskobarometer –
Universidad del
PaisVaseo 2009
(1200 respondents)

FARC

Gallup Poll –
FuerzasMilitares de
cara al Siglo XXI
(1998-2001)
Information on
Armed Islamic
Group –
www.aph.gov.au

GIA

Question

Support for
the Group
View of Al’Qaeda’s Positive 6%
influence in the world
Negative 81%
View of Osama Bin Positive 5%
Laden
Negative 90%
Not Applicable
Less than 5%

Whether the Maoists 60% - good
were good or bad for the
region?
If the Maoists laid down
their arms and took part
in elections today who
would you vote for?
Question related to
ETA- exact words of the
question no known

Exact question
known

21%
Maoists)

(for

13% identified
as former ETA
sympathizers
10%
agreed
with ETAs end
3% justified
support for
ETA with
criticism
(Total support:
13%)
not 2% viewed the
ELN and FARC
favorably

Report – The GIA lost
significant portion of its
membership following
defections to the GPSC
and has only 30-100
active members

Less than 5%
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Hamas

Palestinian Center
for Policy and
Survey ResearchPalestinian Public
Opinion Poll No
(46) 2012 (Sample:
1270 Adults)

Hezbollah Pew Global
Attitudes Survey
2009-10 (Sample:
1000 Muslim
Adults)

Given the outcome of
the war between
Hamas/other
resistance groups and
Israel, in your view
whose way is the best to
end the Israel’s
occupation and build a
Palestinian state:
Hamas’ way or
Abbas’s?
Please tell me if you
have a very favorable,
somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable
or very unfavorable
opinion of Hezbollah?

Certainly
Hamas – 33%
Hamas – 26%
(Total: 59%)

31 % favorable
10% somewhat
favorable
52%

Appendix 1. continued.
Groups

Source

Question

IRA

Hewitt (1990)
and Water and
Fish
1981

Lashkare-Toiba
(LeT)

Pew Global
Attitudes
Survey 2012
(1,206 Adults)

LTTE

Mia Bloom
(2004)
Interview
conducted in
2002
SETA
and
Pollmark
(2009)
(10,577
respondents in
601 urban and
ruralareas)

Percentage holding
positive image of
IRA in Northern
Ireland (exact
question not
known)
Please tell me if you
have very
favorable,
somewhat
favorable,
somewhat
unfavorable or very
unfavorable
opinion of Lashkare-Toiba
Has the LTTE
gained more now
by using
negotiations versus
violence?
In your opinion,
which of the below
will be the most
effective in the
process of
settlement of the
Kurdish question?

PKK

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss2/2
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Support for
the Group
39%

Very
favorable
favorable
22%

+
=

No: 26%

Both Turks
and Kurds
PKK 7.4%
Among Kurds
PKK 18.8%
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Shining
Path

Taliban

do you think, PKK’s
giving up of arms
and participation of
its
members in civil life
would settle the
Kurdish question?
Do you think the
neutralization of
the PKK by the
Turkish Military
Forces would
resolve the Kurdish
question?
People were asked
about their reaction
to a terrorist attack
in connection to
Shining Path?
Support for
Abimael Guzman?

Public Opinion
Poll, Lima 1991
in Harmon
1992

World Public
Opinion Poll
2006,
Afghanistan
(Sample: 2089
Adults)

If your opinion of
Taliban is very
favorable,
favorable,
unfavorable or very
unfavorable?

Both Turks
and
Kurds
51.1% NO
Among
Kurds No
50%
Both Turks
and Kurds
55.6% NO
Among Kurds
No 75.3 %
11% said they
would
understand
it.
17% within
lower
economic
group
8%

Table created by author based on the information provided in the
table.
Appendix ii. Location of Events, Target Selection and Ideology of the Terrorist
Groups
Group
Years
No.
National:
Outside
Target
Ideology
of
in
home home
inci
country
country
dent
s
Abu Sayyaf 1994-2011
209
Philippines
-National
Nationalist/Separatis
(100%)
t +religious
Al Q’aeda

1991-2011

79

Afghanistan
(38%)

Multiple
locations
(62%)

International

Religious

CPI(M)

2005-2011

1418

India
(100%)

--

National

Communist/Socialist

CPN(M)

1996-2008

23

Nepal
(100%)

--

National

Communist/Socialist
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ETA

1970-2011

2027

Spain (97%)

Multiple
locations
(3%)

Mostly
national

Communist
Socialist/Nationalist
separatist

FARC

1975-2011

2060

Colombia
(99%)

Other 1%

National

Communist Socialist

GIA

1994-2006

239

Algeria
(96%)

Mostly
national

Religious

Hamas

1988-2009

297

International

Nationalist
Separatist/religious

Hezbollah

1982-2009

368

West Bank
and
Gaza
strip (58%)
Lebanon
(77%)

Multiple
locations
(4%)
Israel
(41%)
Multiple
locations
(33%)

Mostly
national

Nationalist
Separatist/religious

IRA

1970-2011

2673

Northern
Ireland
(88%)

Great
Britain
and others
(22%)

international
+ national

Nationalist Separatist

LTTE

1979-2010

1607

national

Nationalist Separatist

LeT

1999-2011

118

Sri
Lanka
(99%)
India

India and
others
(1%)

International

Nationalist Separatist
+religious

PKK

1984-2011

1226

Turkey
(86%)

Multiple
(14%)

Mostly
national

Communist Socialist/
Nationalist separatist

Shining
Path

1979-2009

4519

Peru (99%)

Other (1%)

National

Communist Socialist

Taliban

1995-2011

2045

Afghanistan Pakistan
Mostly
Religious
(80%)
(20%)
national
Source: Global Terrorism Database, GTD, Terrorist Organization Profiles and
TOPs and National Counterterrorism Center, Fearon (2003) database on ethnic
fractionalization, Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004)
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Abu
Sayyaf

Al Q’aeda
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Territory
in
home
country
Active
in
Mindanao,
Sulu Island
and Basilan –
major
presence

Political
competition

Limited
presence is
Afghanistan-

Not active in
electoral
politics

Not active in
electoral
politics

Ethnic
fractionalization
in home country
.161

No.
of
Affiliates

.751

36

5
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spread
across North
Africa,
Pakistan,
Middle East,
Southeast
Asia
CPI(M)

Major
presence
India

in

CPN(M)

Major
presence
Nepal

in

Not active in
electoral
politics
but
some support
from certain
political
parties

.811

10

Very active in
electoral
politics

.677

6

ETA

Primarily in
Basque
autonomous
regions in
Northern
Spain and
southwestern
France

Active link
with political
party Herri
Batasuna

.502

4

FARC

Major
presence in
Colombia

Not active in
electoral
politics
but
links
with
Colombian
Communist
Party

.656

6

GIA

Mostly based
in Algeria
with limited
presence
outside

Not active in
electoral
politics

.32

5

Hamas

Major
presence in
West Bank
and
Gaza
Strip

Very active in
electoral
politics

.526

10
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Hezbollah

Major
presence in
Lebanon,
southern
part of
Beirut, Bekka
valley, some
presence in
Europe,
Africa and
South
America

Very active in
electoral
politics

.78

8

Appendix
iii.
continued.
Group

Territory
country

in

home

Ethnic
fractionalization
in home country
.171

No. of
Affiliates

IRA

Major presence in
Northern Ireland with
limited presence in Great
Britain and Europe

Linked with Sinn
Fein

LTTE

Major presence
Lanka

Not
active
in
electoral
politics,
some support from
political parties

.428

3

PKK

Present in Turkey but has
base in Europe, Middle
East and Asia

Not
active
in
electoral
politics,
some support from
political parties

.299

12

Shining
Path

Major presence in rural
Peru

Not
active
in
electoral politics

.638

2

Taliban

Major presence in
Afghanistan and limited
presence in Pakistan

Mostly
politics

.751

4

in

Sri

Political
competition

active

in

Source: Global Terrorism Database, GTD, Terrorist Organization Profiles and TOPs and
National Counterterrorism Center, Fearon (2003) database on ethnic fractionalization,
Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004)
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